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CIVIL RIGHTS-FEDERAL REMEDIES: THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
RECOGNIZES SAME-SEX HARASSMENT UNDER TITLE IX
AND ADOPTS THE "KNEW OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN
STANDARD" FOR SCHOOL DISTRICT LIABILITY
Kinman v. Omaha Public School District, 94 F.3d 463 (8th Cir. 1996)
I. FACTS
From September 1986 through May 1990, Janet Kinman was a
student at Bryan High School in Omaha, Nebraska. I Between the fall of
1987 and spring of 1988, Kinman was enrolled in a sophomore English
class taught by Sheryl McDougall. 2 At some point during the spring of
1988, Kinman became curious about whether McDougall was gay. 3 In
response to this curiosity, Kinman asked McDougall if she had any
friends that were gay, and Kinman wrote a letter to McDougall telling
McDougall that while she liked McDougall, Kinman was not gay. 4 After
McDougall received the letter, Kinman observed McDougall staring at
her, but she did not report this to any school official.5
Kinman and McDougall remained in contact during the following
summer. 6 Later that summer, Kinman attempted suicide and began
drinking alcohol. 7 Kinman told her mother that one of her reasons for
doing so was that McDougall was attempting to convince her that she
(Kinman) was gay, although Kinman told her mother that she did not
want to be gay. 8
During Kinman's junior year, McDougall first admitted to Kinman
that she (McDougall) was gay. 9 During the summer of 1989, following
1. Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 463,465 (8th Cir. 1996).
2. Id.
3. Brief for Appellee at 5, Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 463 (8th Cir. 1996) (No.
95-2809). In March 1988, McDougall received an unsatisfactory evaluation for demonstrating a lack
of professionalism in relation to an incident involving plans to attend a rock concert with Kinman.
Kinman, 94 F.3d at 466. Also, during Kinman's sophomore year, her mother contacted school officials
and requested that Kinman be removed from McDougall's English class, a request that was not
approved. Id.





9. Id. At one point during the year, McDougall called Kinman out of study hall and asked if she
had ever been abused. Id. Kinman confided in McDougall that she was sexually abused as a child.
Id. It was in the course of this delicate conversation that McDougall told Kinman that she
(McDougall) was gay. Id. McDougall also asked Kinman to attend an Alcoholics Anonymous (A.A.)
meeting with her, although Kinman did not know it was a gay A.A. meeting until she arrived. Id.
Kinman argued that McDougall took her to the A.A. meeting on the pretense of seeking help for
Kinman's drinking problem. Brief for Appellant at 2, Kinman (No. 95-2809). During the course of
the meeting, McDougall asked Kinman if she thought a woman at the meeting was attractive and
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Kinman's junior year, McDougall asked Kinman out on a "friend
date."1 0 After the date, Kinman and McDougall went to McDougall's
residence, where McDougall proceeded to caress and kiss Kinman.l I
Kinman claims she resisted these advances. 12 Nevertheless, the two
ended up having sex and spending the night together.' 3 This sexual
relationship continued until November of 1989, when McDougall
temporarily discontinued the relationship after Kinman's mother com-
plained to the school's principal, Robert Whitehouse.14 At that time,
Kinman alleged that McDougall was stalking and harassing her, a charge
McDougall denied. 15
After Kinman graduated in May of 1990, she renewed her relation-
ship with McDougall and continued it until at least August of 1992.16
Kinman's mother then notified Whitehouse, who advised his supervisor,
John Mackiel, that Kinman's mother had proof (in the form of
McDougall's journal) that the relationship was ongoing.17 Following the
authentication of this evidence by school officials, the school district
began proceedings to suspend McDougall for violation of school





14. Id. at 465. School officials began to investigate the relationship in the fall of 1989 and,
although contrary to school policy, McDougall was not suspended or initially questioned during the
investigation. Id. School officials arranged for a tracing device to be installed on Kinman's phone in
an attempt to determine the truth of Kinman's allegation that McDougall was calling. Id. The officials
also arranged for Kinman to take a polygraph exam, which indicated some level of deception. Id.
Kinman then took another polygraph, which also indicated some level of deception. Id. at 465-66.
School officials also learned of the relationship when a friend of Kinman's informed principal Robert
Whitehouse that Kinman and McDougall were involved in a sexual relationship. Id. at 466. Further, a
school guidance counselor reported to Whitehouse a conversation she had with another friend of
Kinman's, who stated that Kinman and McDougall were dating. Id. This was also confirmed by
Kinman's special education teacher, in addition to a report from a teacher's aide, who stated that
McDougall was constantly peering into her classroom to check on Kinman. Id.
15. Id. McDougall denied the allegations to Whitehouse's supervisor, John Mackiel, the assistant
superintendent for personnel. Id. McDougall was not given a polygraph exam. Id.
16. Id. The defendants contend the relationship continued much longer. and that Kinman and
McDougall were engaged in sexual relations five or six times a week when Kinman filed her
complaint in May of 1993. Brief for Appellee at 14, Kinnian (No. 95-2809). It is further suggested
that these relations continued through Kinman's deposition in January of 1994. Id.
17. Kinman. 94 F.3d at 466. Mackiel requested a copy of the journal and had a private investi-
gator perform a handwriting analysis, which indicated the journal belonged to McDougall. Id. Kin-
man's mother also provided Mackiel with incriminating photographs of McDougall and Kinman, as
well as a series of cards written by McDougall to Kinman. Id.
[VOL. 74:141
1998] CASE COMMENT
policy.18 McDougall was subsequently terminated and her teaching
certificate revoked in September of 1992.19
On May 6, 1993, Kinman brought action in United States District
Court for the District of Nebraska against the school district, Whitehouse,
Mackiel, and McDougall, individually and in their official capacities,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (Title IX) for
hostile environment sexual harassment. 20 In considering Kinman's Title
IX claim, the district court concluded that Title IX's language does not
permit a cause of action against agents of a school district. 21 The court
based this decision on the rationale that McDougall's actions did not
constitute discrimination under a "program or activity" of the school
district. 22  Consequently, the district court granted the defendants'
motion for summary judgment on the Title IX claim and Kinman
appealed the ruling. 23
In a unanimous decision, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court's decision on the Title IX issue. 24 In so doing,
the court held that same sex harassment is actionable under Title IX
and that the "knew or should have known" standard for ascertaining
institutional liability is the appropriate standard to apply in a hostile
environment sexual harassment case. 25
18. Id. The district has a policy against sexual abuse or harassment of students on the basis of
sex. Id. at 466 n. 1. The prohibition extends to any employee whether (1) he or she is on or off duty;
(2) the conduct occurs on or off the school's property; (3) the student does or does not welcome or
invite the conduct; (4) the abuse or harassment occurs within two years of the student leaving the
district. Id.
19. Id. at 466; Brief for Appellee at 9-10, Kinnzan (No. 95-2809).
20. Kinman, 94 F.3d at 466; Brief for Appellee at 1, Kinnian (No. 95-2809).
21. Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., No. 8: CV93-190, slip op. at 7 (D. Neb. June 12, 1995).
22. Id. at 8.
23. Kinman, 94 F.3d at 469.
24. Id. at 463. In ascertaining the school district's liability for Kinman's § 1983 claim, the court
held that such liability is premised on the existence of a continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of
unconstitutional conduct, as well as deliberate indifference or tacit authorization and causation on
behalf of the school district. Id. at 467 (citing Jane Doe A. v. Special Sch. Dist., 901 F.2d 642, 646 (8th
Cir. 1990)). The court affirmed the lower court's decision that Kinman failed to make such a
showing. Id. Thus, this article will focus primarily on the Title IX claim of hostile environment sexual
harassment and the standard for ascertaining institutional liability for such acts.
25. Id. at 469. After remand to the district court and a subsequent trial, a jury awarded Kinman
$25,000 in damages. See Rick Ruggles, Jury: Bryan Graduate Was Harassed, OMAHA WORLD-
HERALD, Oct. 24, 1997 available in 1997 WL 6317879. Media reports on the verdict indicate that
jurors said the school district should not have needed three years to determine that Kinman was
involved with McDougall. See Paul Goodsell, District, Ex-Student Disagree on Handling of Affair,
OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Nov. 24, 1997, available in 1997 WL 6322023. Motions by the school district
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial were later denied by the district court.
See Judge Won't Reverse Kininan Case Verdict, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Feb. 10, 1998, available in
1998 WL 5494517. A motion by Kinman for attorney's fees filed on Nov. 6, 1997 is pending.
Telephone interview with James E. Harris, Attorney for Janet Kinman (Feb. 25, 1998).
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. TITLE IX OF THE EDUCATION AMENDMENTS OF 1972
Title IX provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on
the basis of sex ... be subjected to discrimination under any educa-
tion program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 26 The
legislation was enacted to protect individuals from sex discrimination by
denying federal financial aid to those educational institutions that bear
responsibility for sexually discriminatory practices.27 To accomplish
this goal, employees and students of federally funded educational
institutions who are discriminated against on the basis of sex have a
private right of action under Title IX for injunctive relief and compensa-
tory damages. 28 In interpreting Title IX, the United States Supreme
Court has specifically admonished courts that "there is no doubt that if
we are to give it the scope that its origins dictate, we must accord it a
sweep as broad as its language." 29
1. Sexual Harassment Under Title IX
In attempting to alleviate discrimination on the basis of sex, Congress
has attempted to strike at the core of sexual discrimination by enacting
legislation to prevent it in the workplace 30 and classrooms. 31 In interpre-
ting sex discrimination within Title VII and Title IX, courts have con-
strued sexual harassment as an actionable form of sex discrimination.
32
In a Title IX context, sexual harassment can manifest itself in several
ways, including: a teacher making sexual comments to or inappropri-
ately touching a student; solicitation or coercion of sexual acts by
students; or promising to grade students highly or poorly depending on
their submission to these advances. 33 To this end, to state a cause of
26. 20 U.S.C. § 168 1(a) (1994).
27. See Cannon v. Universitv of Chicago. 441 U.S. 677. 7a n.36 (!OO (,ng 1!7 Cco... R c.
39,252 (1971)).
28. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 75-6 (1992) (allowing monetary
damages to those seeking relief for Title IX violations rather than mere injunctive or equitable relief).
29. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982).
30. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994 & Supp. 1997) (providing that discrimi-
nation on the basis of sex is illegal in the workplace); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1997) (promulgating
guidelines on discrimination because of sex, including sexual harassment).
31. See generally 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681 to 1688 (1994) (providing for gender equality in public
schools).
32. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 56, 73 (1986) (holding hostile environment sexual
harassment to be an actionable form of discrimination on the basis of sex).
33. Neera Rellan Stacy, Note, Seeking a Superior Liability Standard Under Title IX for Teacher-
Student Sexual Harassment, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1338, 1338 (1996).
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action under Title IX, a student must show: (1) that he or she was
excluded from participation in, denied the benefits of, or subjected to
discrimination in an educational program; (2) that the program receives
federal assistance; and (3) that the exclusion, denial, or discrimination
was on the basis of sex. 34
To successfully prove a claim of hostile environment sexual harass-
ment, in addition to the basic Title IX elements delineated above, a
plaintiff must show: (1) that he or she is a member of a protected group;
(2) that the plaintiff was subject to unwelcome harassment; (3) that the
harassment was based on sex; (4) that the charged sexual harassment had
unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff's education and created an
intimidating, hostile or offensive educational environment that seriously
affected the psychological well-being of the plaintiff; and (5) that some
basis for institutional liability has been established. 35
In proving that a plaintiff is a member of a protected group, Title
IX implicitly provides protection for both genders, as courts have
specifically held that, like Title VII, the proper inquiry is whether mem-
bers of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of
employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed. 36 In
order to meet the second requirement that the student was subject to
unwelcome harassment, he or she must prove the harassment was not
solicited or incited and that it was regarded as undesirable or offensive.37
In addition, to determine whether the advance is unwelcome, "the age of
the student, the nature of the conduct involved, and the harasser's degree
of authority over the student must be considered." 38 Relatedly, when
the accused claims the harassment was consensual, "the student's age is
a critical factor." 39 To successfully prove the third element, that the
alleged harassment was based on sex, a plaintiff must show that "but
for" the plaintiff's sex, the harassment would not have occurred.40
34. Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1232 (10th Cir. 1996).
35. See Does v. Covington County Sch. Bd. of Educ., 930 F. Supp. 554, 568 (M.D. Ala. 1996)
(citing Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1194 (11 th Cir. 1996); Nelson v. Almont
Community Sch., 931 F. Supp. 1345, 1356 (E.D. Mich. 1996)).
36. See Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 463, 465 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Quick v.
Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1378 (8th Cir. 1996)) (extending to Title IX the Title VII principle that
discrimination of any individual, man or woman, based on that person's sex is illegal).
37. See Does, 930 F. Supp. at 569 (citing Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 (11 th Cir.
1982)).
38. Jeffrey A. Thaler, Sexual Harassment at School: A Legal Primer, TRIAL, Nov. 1997, at 62,
66.
39. Id. In evaluating the victim's age, the United States Department of Education's Office of
Civil Rights [hereinafter OCR] guidelines never view sexual contact or harassment with an elementary
student to be consensual. Id. Further, for secondary students, "there will be a strong presumption that
sexual contact ... is not consensual." Id. (quoting 62 Fed. Reg. 12,040 (1997)).
40. Does, 930 F. Supp. at 569 (citing Henson, 682 F.2d at 904).
1998]
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Proving the fourth element in a hostile environment case requires a
showing that in its totality, the harassment is so severe or sufficiently
pervasive as to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive
working environment. 4 1 Sexually hostile or intimidating environments
are usually characterized by multiple and varied combinations and
frequencies of offensive exposures. 42 Thus, under the hostile environ-
ment theory, a plaintiff generally must show repeated, habitual com-
ments or conduct that occurred with some frequency, as opposed to a
single or isolated offensive incident.4 3 Finally, a hostile environment in
an educational setting is not created by simple childlike behavior or by
an offensive utterance, comment, or vulgarity.44
2. Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Under Title IX
The language of Title IX does not expressly address same-sex
discrimination or harassment. 45 Nevertheless, cases have held that the
intent of Title IX is the same regardless of the sex of the one harassing
and the one being harassed.4 6 As with most aspects of Title IX, liability
for sexual harassment by a member of the same sex finds its roots in
Title VII.47 Both the United States Supreme Court and several circuits
have recognized same-sex harassment as actionable under Title VII.48
41. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (explaining the requisite level of proof in
a hostile environment sexual harassment case). A hostile environment is assessed from the
perspective of the victim. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991).
42. Nelson v. Almont Community Schs., 931 F. Supp. 1345, 1357 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
43. Id.; see also Chamberlin v. 101 Realty, Inc., 915 F.2d 777, 783 (1st Cir. 1990) (finding that
under Title VII an isolated sexual advance, without more, does not satisfy the abusive environment
requirement). But see Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1305 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that a single
incident of sexual assault is sufficient to establish a hostile working environment for Title VII liability).
44. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1194 (1 1th Cir. 1996) vacated on other
grounds, 120 F.3d 1390 (1 1th Cir. 1997) (en banc). In determining whether a plaintiff has met the
fourth element of a hostile environment claim, a court must be particularly concerned with: (1) the
frequency of abusive conduct; (2) the severity of the conduct; (3) whether the conduct is physically
threatening or humiliating rather than merely offensive; and (4) whether it unreasonably interferes
with a plaintiff's performance. Id. (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 22).
45. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1) (1994) (prohibiting discrimination in educational institutions
46. Does v. Covington County Bd. of Educ., 930 F. Supp. 554, 568 (M.D. Ala. 1996). Likewise,
the form of sexual harassment (hostile environment or quid pro quo) does not affect whether
harassment by a member of the same sex is actionable under Title IX. See id. at 568-69 (noting that
both theories of harassment law attack a manifestation of the same evil the law is designed to protect).
47. See Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 463, 468 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding same-sex
harassment actionable under Title IX based on a similar holding under Title VII) (citing Quick v.
Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1378 (8th Cir. 1996)).
48. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., No. 96-568, 1998 WL 88039, at 3
(U.S. Mar. 4, 1998) (recognizing same-sex harassment under Title VII and stating that there is no
justification in the statutory language or precedent for a categorical rule excluding such claims).
Quick, 90 F.3d at 1376 n.4 (holding that same-sex harassment is actionable under Title VII);
Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Corp., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that same-sex harassment
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Consequently, many of these Title VII principles have been applied to
Title IX. 49
As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted in Doe v. City of
Belleville,50 the linchpin for same-sex harassment under Title VII is that
the legislation draws no distinction between men and women, either as
plaintiffs or harassers. 5 1 The court found that the rationale for not
distinguishing between the sexes in anti-discrimination legislation is that
it makes little difference whether the victim is male or female; in either
case, gender has become inextricably intertwined with the harassment. 52
Thus, each sex has the potential to be a victim of sex discrimination and
the gender of the harasser is of little consequence. 53  This rationale has
provided the basis for the majority of courts to recognize same-sex
sexual harassment under Title VII.54 To that end, many of these same
is recognizable under appropriate circumstances); Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459,
1464 (9th Cir. 1994) (recognizing that although this case involved sexual harassment by a male to a
female, similar conduct directed by the male supervisor to male employees could be actionable);
Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hosp., 4 F.3d 134, 148 (2d Cir. 1993) (Van Graafeiland, J.,
concurring) (stating that sexual harassment is actionable if committed by either a member of the same
sex or opposite sex of the individual being harassed); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 n.7 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (stating that the court previously rejected the argument that sexual harassment could not be
gender discrimination simply because a homosexual supervisor could harass an employee of the same
gender).
49. See, e.g., Kinman, 94 F.3d at 468 (citing Quick, 90 F.3d at 1379) (recognizing same-sex
hostile environment harassment under Title IX and adopting the proposition that the proper inquiry is
"whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to
which members of the other sex are not exposed"); Does, 930 F. Supp. at 568 (recognizing same-sex
quid pro quo sexual harassment in a Title IX claim).
50. 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997).
51. See Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 574 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that same-sex hostile
environment sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII). Similar to Title VII, the language of
Title IX also draws no distinction between males and females. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994).
52. Belleville, 119 F.3d at 578. Particularly with hostile environment claims, gender is of little
consequence since the premise of that theory is "that the conditions of the plaintiff's work
environment have been altered in a way that made the environment hostile to him or her as a man or
woman." See id. (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993)) (emphasis original). As
well, many argue that same-gender claims do not present novel or difficult questions under Title VII.
Petitioner's Brief at 34, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., No. 96-568, 1997 WL 458826,
(U. S. filed Aug. 11, 1997). Rather, "[t]he courts will have to consider, as they do in the traditional
harassment scenario, the conduct of the defendants, the sexual nature of the conduct, its offensiveness
and 'unwelcomeness' and whether it altered the reasonable terms and condition's [sic] of the victim's
employment." Id.
53. Belleville, 119 F.3d at 578. As described by the petitioner in Oncale, the focus should be on
the underlying harassment rather than gender:
The gender of Mr. Oncale's harasser neither defines nor detracts from the sexually
harassing nature of the defendants' conduct. To the contrary, one can assert with some
confidence that there is no type of conduct more repulsive to the nonconsenting
heterosexual male and more certain to drive him from the workplace than that engaged
in by the defendants in this case. Why is such conduct so degrading and humiliating?
Because Joseph Oncale is a man. The defendants targeted Joseph Oncale for harassing
treatment and selected their method and manner of sexual harassment because he was
male and because of his sexual identity as a man, confident that Joseph Oncale would
find the employment situation intolerable.
Petitioner's Brief at 18-19, Oncale (No. 96-568).
54. Belleville, .119 F.3d at 573-74 (citing Fredette v. BVP Management Assoc., 112 F.3d 1503,
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reasons have provided the basis for courts to recognize same-sex harass-
ment under Title IX.55
B. INSTITUTIONAL LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT UNDER TITLE IX
Cases addressing sexual harassment under Title IX have predicated
recovery on some showing of institutional liability. 56 Due to the slow
development of legal standards under Title IX, courts have often looked
to standards for employer liability under Title VII57 for guidance
whenconsidering institutional liability for Title IX claims.58 In looking
1506 (1 lth Cir. 1997); Yeary v. Goodwill Indus. Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443, 447-48 (6th Cir. 1997);
Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Amer., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 142-43 (4th Cir. 1996); Quick v. Donaldson Co.,
90 F.3d 1372, 1376 (8th Cir. 1996); McCoy v. Macon Water Authority, 966 F. Supp. 1209, 1215-17
(M.D. Ga. 1997); Caldwell v. KFC Corp., 958 F. Supp. 962, 967 (D.N.J. 1997); Wehrle v. Office
Depot, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 234, 236 (W.D. Okla. 1996); Miller v. Vesta, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 697, 701-02
(E.D. Wis. 1996); Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1403, 1409 (E.D. Wis. 1996); Shermer v.
Illinois Dep't of Transp., 937 F. Supp. 781-83 (C.D. I11. 1996); Gerd v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 934 F.
Supp. 357, 360 (D. Colo. 1996); Johnson v. Community Nursing Servs., 932 F. Supp. 269, 272-73 (D.
Utah 1996); Wang v. Thomas Pontiac, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 393, 400-03 (D. Minn. 1996); Tietgen v.
Brown's Westminster Motors, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1495, 1502-03 (E.D. Va. 1996); Williams v. District
of Columbia. 916 F. Supp. 1, 7-10 (D.D.C. 1996); King v. M.R. Brown, Inc., 911 F. Supp. 161, 166-68
(E.D. Pa. 1995); Easton v. Crossland Mortgage Corp., 905 F. Supp. 1368, 1378-80 (C.D. Cal. 1995),
rev'd on other grounds, 114 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 1997); Blozis v. Mike Raisor Ford, Inc., 896 F. Supp.
805, 806-07 (N.D. Ind. 1995); Raney v. District of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283, 286-88 (D.D.C. 1995);
Nogueras v. University of Puerto Rico, 890 F. Supp. 60, 62-3 (D.P.R. 1995); Griffith v. Keystone Steel
& Wire, Div. of Keystone Consol. Indus., Inc., 887 F. Supp. 1133, 1136-37 (C.D. 111. 1995); EEOC v.
Walden Book Co., 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1102-04 (M.D. Tenn. 1995); Prescott v. Independent Life &
Accident Ins. Co., 878 F. Supp. 1545, 1549-51 (M.D. Ala. 1995); Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 597
F. Supp. 537, 541-42 (M.D. Ala. 1983); Wright v. Methodist Youth Servs., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307, 310
(N.D. II1. 1981)). But see Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 28 F.3d 446, 451-52 (5th Cir.
1994) (holding that harassment by a male supervisor against a male subordinate was not actionable
since Title VII addresses gender discrimination), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2430 (1997); Vandeventer v.
Wabash Nat'l Corp., 867 F. Supp. 790, 796 (N.D. Ind. 1994) (holding that Title VII is aimed at a
gender-biased atmosphere; an atmosphere of oppression by a "dominant" gender); Hopkins v.
Baltimore Gas & Electric Co., 871 F. Supp. 822, 834 (D. Md. 1994) (stating that allowing a claim for
same-sex harassment "strains" at the intent of Title VII); Goluszek v. H.P. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452,
1456 (N.D. 111. 1988) (refusing to find a cause of action for male-male sexual harassment on the basis
that Title VII was enacted to prevent an abuse of power and the victim was in a male-dominated
environment); Susan Perissinotto Woodhouse, Comment, Same-Gender Sexual Harassment: Is it Sex
Discrimination Under Title VII?, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1147, 1151-52 (1996) (arguing that same sex
harassment should not be permitted under Title VII).55. Does v. Covington Cunty, Bd. cf Ed, , 93n F. Sup 554 o56 . v.. l. 9 6)(u gnz g
same-sex quid pro quo sexual harassment in a Title IX claim).
56. See id. at 568 (citing Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1194 (11th Cir.
1996); Nelson v. Almont Community Sch., 931 F. Supp. 1345, 1356 (E.D. Mich. 1996)).
57. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it "an unlawful employment practice for an
employer.., to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1994).
58. See, e.g., Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992) (relying on Title VII
principles decided in Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986)); Kadiki v. Virginia
Commonwealth Univ., 892 F. Supp. 746, 749-50 (E.D. Va. 1995) (stating that Title VII provides a
persuasive body of standards for shaping a Title IX action). Courts often look to Title VII employer
liability standards in considering institutional liability under Title IX. See Rosa H. v. San Elizario
Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648, 655 (5th Cir. 1997); Doe v. Claiborne County Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d
495, 514 (6th Cir. 1996); Brine v. University of Iowa, 90 F.3d 271, 275 (8th Cir. 1996); Murray v. New
148
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to Title VII for guidance, there is currently a division among federal
courts between several standards for ascertaining institutional liability for
hostile environment sexual harassment under Title IX.59 These standards
include: (1) strict liability for school district or institutional liability; 60
(2) institutional liability if the school district knowingly fails to act;6 1 (3)
no institutional liability unless there is direct discrimination; 62 and (4)
liability if the school district knew or should have known of the
discrimination. 63
In adopting the strict liability standard, the court in Bolon v. Rolla
Public Schools64 identified three compelling reasons for imputing the
acts of teachers to the school district: (1) Title IX's language is very
broad; (2) unlike employers, school districts make express assurances to
prohibit sex discrimination in exchange for the acceptance of federal
funds; and (3) students are required to attend certain levels of school,
which places a high duty on public school districts to protect the interests
York Univ. College of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243, 249 (2d Cir. 1995); Nicole M. v. Martinez Unified Sch.
Dist., 964 F. Supp. 1369, 1376 (N.D. Cal. 1997); Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 949 F. Supp. 1415,
1421 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Nelson, 931 F. Supp. at 1356; Does, 930 F. Supp. at 568; Bolon v. Rolla Pub.
Sch., 917 F. Supp. 1423, 1429 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Bosley v. Kearney R-I Sch. Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006,
1022 (W.D. Mo. 1995); Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288, 1290 (N.D. Cal.
1993). Commentators have noted that Title VII is more developed than Title IX for four reasons: (1)
students, unlike employees, are more transient and therefore, less likely to file claims; (2) students may
lack financial resources to pursue their cause of action; (3) courts have historically shown reluctance
in evaluating decisions of academic institutions; (4) the scope and nature of relief under Title IX
remains unclear. Stacy, supra note 33, at 1345 (citing Ronna Greff Schneider, Sexual Harassment
and Higher Education, 65 TEx. L. REV. 525, 527-28 (1987)).
59. See Bolon, 917 F. Supp. at 1427 (explaining different approaches utilized by federal courts to
determine institutional liability under Title IX); see also Stacy, supra note 33, at 1348-52 (discussing
the various approaches to institutional liability under Title IX); Thaler, supra note 38, at 66 (outlining
four standards of institutional liability utilized in federal courts).
60. Bolon, 917 F. Supp at 1427.
61. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 881-82 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that under this same stan-
dard used in Title VII, an employer can be liable if it fails to take "immediate and appropriate" action
"reasonably calculated" to remedy the complained of harm); Burrow ex rel. Burrow v. Postville Com-
munity Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193, 1207 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (citing Davis, 74 F.3d at 1194) (adopting
the knowing failure to act standard for Title IX institutional liability); Bosley, 904 F. Supp. at 1023 (find-
ing liability for an institution if the institution or school district knew of the harassment and intentionally
failed to take proper remedial action); Patricia H., 830 F. Supp. at 1297 (adopting the "knowing failure
to act" standard for institutional liability).
62. Rosa H., 106 F.3d at 657 (concluding that "Title IX requires a showing of actual, intentional
discrimination on the part of the school district"); Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006,
1008 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that there can be no institutional liability "absent allegations that the
school district itself directly discriminated based on sex"); Aurelia D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ.,
862 F. Supp. 363, 367-68 (M.D. Ga. 1994) (dismissing a plaintiffs complaint when it was not alleged
that an employee of the school board had any role in the harassment); see also Seamons v. Snow, 84
F.3d 1226, 1233 (10th Cir. 1996) (declining to adopt a standard for institutional liability but questioning
the liability of a school district based on mere negligence rather than any deliberate intention to
discriminate on the basis of sex).
63. Murray, 57 F.3d at 249 (citing 29 CFR § 1604.1 l(d) (1993)); Petaluma, 949 F. Supp. at 1421;
Kadiki, 892 F. Supp. at 750; Hastings v. Hancock, 842 F. Supp. 1315, 1319 (D. Kan. 1993) (citing
Hirschfeld v. New Mexico Corrections Dept., 916 F.2d 572, 577 (10th Cir. 1990)); see also 62 Fed.
Reg. 12,036 (1997) (OCR regulation advocating a constructive "should have known test" for
adjudicating school liability).
64. 917 F. Supp. 1423 (E.D. Mo. 1995).
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of children.65 The court further reasoned that absent a strict liability
standard, "the school would be effectively insulated from all Title IX
liability." 66
In analyzing the "knowing failure to act" standard, courts have
specified that institutional liability is premised on the intention of the
school district in responding (or failing to respond) to the harassment. 67
For instance, in Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified School District,68 the
court adopted this standard in light of factual allegations that the school
district not only failed to respond to the plaintiff's complaints regarding
sexual abuse by a teacher, but most significantly that the school contin-
ued to employ the teacher despite a brief suspension of his license for
admitting to an act of sexual misconduct.69
The direct or intentional discrimination standard for institutional
liability was adopted by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Rosa H. v.
San Elizario Independent School District.70 In that case, the court ex-
amined Title IX's structure and legislative history to find that it is un-
likely that Congress intended Title IX to make funding contingent upon
whether a school district succeeded in preventing teachers from "cultivat-
ing covert sexual relationships with students." 7 1 Thus, the court held
that Title IX requires a showing of "actual, intentional discrimination on
the part of the school district." 72
The "knew or should have known" standard has been adopted by
several courts and the United States Department of Education's Office of
Civil Rights.73 For example, in Doe v. Petaluma City School District,74
the court adopted the "knew or should have known" standard under
Title IX after considering its application in a Title VII context. 75 In its
opinion, the court found that the plaintiff must prove that the institution
knew or should have known, in the exercise of its legal duties, of the
65. Bolon, 917 F. Supp. at 1428:
66. Id. at 1429.
67. See Burrow ex rel. Burrow v. Postville Community Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193, 1207 (N.D.
Iowa 1996) (holding that a student must show that the school district knew of the harassment and
intenitlionally failled a , c da action); P H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 8 F.
Supp. 1288, 1297 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (stating that a school district may be held liable if it failed to take
reasonable steps to aid students victimized by sexual harassment).
68. 830 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
69. Patricia H., 830 F. Supp. at 1300-01.
70. Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648, 657 (5th Cir. 1997).
71. Id. at 657.
72. Id.
73. See Thaler, supra note 38, at 66 (citing 62 Fed. Reg. 12,036 (1997)).
74. 949 F. Supp. 1415 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
75. See Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 949 F. Supp. 1415, 1421 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (noting that the
appropriateness of using Title VII standards in a Title IX case is well established).
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harassment. 76 The court found that under this standard an entity cannot
be held liable if it takes prompt, appropriate remedial action. 77 Thus, the
court concluded that the standard's flexibility allows the schools an
appropriate amount of discretion in determining how to best respond to
harassment. 78
III. CASE ANALYSIS
In Kinman v. Omaha Public School District,79 the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the district court's judgment
on the plaintiff's Title IX claim on two grounds. 80 First, the court of
appeals reversed based on its rejection of the district court's conclusion
that same-sex harassment was not actionable under Title IX.81 Second,
the court remanded the case in light of the "knew or should have
known" standard and questions as to exactly when the school district
obtained knowledge of the alleged harassment. 82
A. TITLE IX DISCRIMINATION CLAIM
The court noted that Kinman is entitled to bring an action under
Title IX83 based on the United States Supreme Court's recognition of an
implied private cause of action under the legislation 84 and because sex-
ual harassment is an actionable form of sexual discrimination.85 Because
Kinman was seeking relief under a hostile environment theory of sexual
harassment, she was required to show five elements in her cause of ac-
tion, including: (1) that she belonged to a protected group; (2) that she
was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) that the harassment was
based on sex; (4) that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive
so as to alter the conditions of her education and created an abusive edu-
cational environment; and (5) that some basis for institutional liability
has been established. 86
In opposing Kinman's Title IX claim, the school district raised three
primary arguments. 87 First, the defendants argued that the sexual contact
76. Id. at 1426.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. 94 F.3d 463 (8th Cir. 1996).
80. Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 463, 469 (8th Cir. 1996).
81. Id. at 468.
82. Id. at 469.
83. 20 U.S.C. § 168 1(a) (1994).
84. See Kinman, 94 F.3d at 467 (citing Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 75-76
(1992)).
85. See id. (citing Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 56, 64 (1986)).
86. See id. at 467-68 (citing Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1232 (10th Cir. 1996)).
87. Id. at 468.
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between McDougall and Kinman was consensual. 88 The defendants
based this argument on the assertion that Kinman willingly participated
in the affair and that she continued to engage in the relationship
following graduation and through the time of her suit, including the
weekend before her deposition in January of 1994.89 The court deter-
mined that a factual issue remained to be considered on remand because
Kinman alleged that she initially did not welcome McDougall's advances
and that the notion of being gay was so upsetting to her that it led her to
attempt suicide. 90 Additionally, the court noted that the United States
Supreme Court's holding in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson 9l explained
the relevant question is not whether the plaintiff voluntarily participated
in sexual relations, but whether the advances were unwelcome. 92
The defendants further argued that Kinman was not discriminated
against on the basis of sex because sexual harassment between members
of the same gender is not actionable, an argument which the court flatly
rejected. 93 The court premised its recognition of same-sex harassment
under Title IX on the basis that such harassment is actionable under
Title VII.94 Additionally, the court recognized such harassment under
Title IX because the "uncontroverted evidence showed that McDougall
targeted Kinman because she was a woman." 95 Similarly, the court
found no evidence that McDougall directed similar attentions toward
male students, supporting the proposition that Kinman was discriminated
"because of' her sex. 96
88. Id.
89. Id.; Brief for Appellee at 14, Kinman (No. 95-2809).
90. Kinman, 94 F.3d at 468. Thus, this issue was remanded in part based on the possibility that
any advances by a member of Kinman's own sex would have been unwelcome. Id.
91. 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986).
92. See Kinman, 94 F.3d at 467 (citing Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986)). As
the United States Supreme Court noted:
To distinguish between an actual desire for a relationship, on the one hand, and a mere
acquiescence to tendered sexual advances on the other, it is necessary to consider the
power disparity between the individuals involved. The question '[p]resents difficult
problems of proof and turns largely on credibility determinations committed to the tier of
Id. at 468 (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68).
93. Id.
94. Id. (citing Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1376 (8th Cir. 1996)).
95. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (stating that the proper inquiry is whether members of one sex





B. INSTITUTIONAL LIABILITY UNDER TITLE IX
The defendants also claimed that Kinman failed to offer evidence to
support liability against the district and school officials for McDougall's
conduct.97 The court noted the disparity among various federal courts
concerning the appropriate standard for institutional liability under Title
IX for hostile environment sexual harassment. 98 Accordingly, the court
found that Title VII provided the necessary guidance to promulgate an
institutional liability standard for the Eighth Circuit in considering Title
IX claims. 99
In looking at Title VII standards of liability, the court noted that
some degree of culpable behavior should be required to hold a school
district or institution liable in a hostile environment harassment case.100
Since the court had previously utilized the "knew or should have
known" standard in a Title VII hostile environment sexual harassment
case, it found that standard applicable in this situation, as the standard
contemplates some degree of culpable behavior by the employer or
school district.101 To successfully prevail on a hostile environment claim
under the "knew or should have known" standard, an employee or
student must not only show that the employer knew or should have
known of the alleged harassment, but also that the employer also failed
to take remedial action.102
In light of the adoption of this standard, the court concluded that
a factual dispute remained regarding exactly when the school district
and school officials obtained knowledge of the relationship between
McDougall and Kinman, and whether, once the school and school
officials obtained this knowledge, they took reasonable steps to remedy
97. Id.
98. See id. (citing Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1008 (5th Cir. 1996) (find-
ing no liability absent direct discrimination by the institution); Bolon v. Rolla Pub. Sch., 917 F. Supp.
1423, 1429 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (holding the school district strictly liable for administrator or teacher
sexual harassment); Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 887 F. Supp. 140, 143 (W.D. Tex. 1995)
(finding institutional liability only if the school knew or should have known of the harassment); Patricia
H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288, 1297 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (finding institutional
liability only upon a showing that the district knowingly failed to act)).
99. Kinman, 94 F.3d at 469 (citing Murray v. New York Univ. College of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243,
249 (2d Cir. 1995); Bosley v. Keamey R-I Sch. Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006, 1022 (W.D. Mo. 1995)).
100. See id. In a hostile environment case, a harasser is not acting within the scope of employ-
ment by conditioning some job benefit on sexual acts. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 56,
72 (1986). Since agency principles do not apply, courts often require employers to engage in some
action or inaction that would constitute liability for the harassment by one of its employees. See
Kinman, 94 F.3d at 469 (adopting the "knew or should have known" standard for imputing liability to a
school district).
101. Id.
102. Id. (citing Callanan v. Runyan, 75 F.3d 1293, 1296 (8th Cir. 1996)).
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the situation. 103 The court then reversed and remanded the case to the
district court for further consideration consistent with the court's
opinion. 104
IV. IMPACT
The decision in Kinman established for the first time in the Eighth
Circuit that same-sex harassment is actionable under Title IX.105
Although the United States Supreme Court has not addressed same-sex
harassment under Title IX, it recently held that such harassment is
actionable under Title VII when it reversed the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals' decision in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services.106 In On-
cale, the Fifth Circuit had reaffirmed its decision in Garcia v. Elf
Autochem, North America1 07 that sexual harassment by a member of the
same sex is not actionable.108 While the Court acknowledged same-sex
harassment was not the principal evil Congress was concerned with where
it enacted Title VII, the Court noted that statutory prohibitions often go
beyond principal evils to cover reasonably comparable evils. 109 It is on
this basis and the broad proscription of discrimination because of sex
that led the court to unanimously recognize a same-sex hostile
environment sexual harassment claim under Title VII.l10
It is likely, however, that the Kinman decision's most significant
impact will be made when the United States Supreme Court considers
the question of institutional liability under Title IX.I"l By adopting the
103. Kinman, 94 F.3d at 469.
104. Id. The court found there was no genuine issue of material fact on the § 1983 claim since
the plaintiff could not prove any set of facts that would show the individual defendants were deliber-
ately indifferent or tacitly authorized the alleged conduct. Id. at 467. The court noted that the indi-
vidual defendants in this case did not turn a "blind eye" to the situation. Id. Rather, the court found
these individuals attempted to monitor Kinman's phone calls; administered polygraph examinations;
interviewed both Kinman and McDougall; and once they had conclusive proof of the relationship, the
defendants promptly terminated the teacher and sought revocation of her teaching certificate. Id.
While the court noted that these defendants could have or should have acted sooner, this does not
constitute deliberate indifference or tacit authorization. Id. Thus, the court ruled that the district court
correctly granted summary judgment on behalf of the individual defendants and the school district on
the § 1983 claim. Id.
105. See id. at 468 (reaffirming Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1376 (8th Cir. 1996)
(holding that same-sex harassment is actionable under Title VII)).
106. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., No. 96-568, 1998 WL 88039, at 4 (U.S. Mar. 4,
1998). See Donald C. Dillworth, Sexual Orientation Irrelevant in Man-to-Man Harassment, TRIAL,
Oct. 1997, at 82, 84.
107. Garcia v. Elf Autochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1994).
108. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 120 (5th Cir. 1996).
109. Oncale, 1998 WL 88039, at 3.
110. See id.
111. See generally S.B.L. v. Evans, 80 F.3d 307, 309 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating that the Supreme
Court has not reached an established standard for institutional liability under Title IX).
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"knew or should have known" standard, the court in Kinman estab-
lished the definitive standard of institutional liability in the Eighth
Circuit for hostile environment sexual harassment under Title IX.112
Since the Supreme Court's 1992 decision in Franklin v. Gwinnett
County Public Schools, 113 which gave students a private cause of action
for monetary damages under Title IX,114 courts have seen an increased
number of Title IX cases.1 15 As well, statistics indicate discrimination
and sexual harassment cases in schools are on the rise. 116 Such statistics
demonstrate the urgency and need to reconcile the ambiguity resulting
from the numerous standards of institutional liability currently being
adopted by federal courts throughout the country."i 7
To address this problem, the Supreme Court recently granted certi-
orari to consider that precise question in Gebser v. Lago Vista Indepen-
dent School District."i8 In considering Gebser, the Court will address the
lower court's decision that actual knowledge by a school official and a
failure by that official to take action is required to find institutional liabil-
ity."19 Since this is the most protective standard courts have applied in
ascertaining institutional liability, 20 the Court may affirm the use of the
more moderate "knew or should have known" standard it is considering
112. Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 463, 469 (8th Cir. 1996).
113. 503 U.S. 60(1992).
114. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992).
115. See Thaler, supra note 38, at 62 (stating that since Franklin, courts "have issued a large
number and variety of decisions, with no further guidance from the Supreme Court").
116. Stacy, supra note 33, at 1343. A national survey of more than 1600 students in grades eight
through eleven revealed that roughly 80% of the students surveyed believe they had experienced
some form of sexual harassment in school, either by teachers, school officials, or peers. Id. (citing
Mary Jordan, Sex Harassment Complaints Starting in Grade School: Taunts, Intolerance on the Rise,
Survey Finds, WASH. POST, June 2, 1993, at AI (reporting on a survey conducted for the American
Association of University Women that found that 85% of girls and 76% of boys believed they had
been sexually harassed)).
117. See id. The urgency is most effectively illustrated by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
where that court. has adopted conflicting institutional liability standards. See Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393, 400-01 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2434 (1997) (refusing to find
institutional liability since notice of sexual abuse was given to a teacher not far enough up the chain of
command); Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648, 660 (5th Cir. 1997) (refusing to
find liability absent proof of actual knowledge or direct involvement by the school district in the
discrimination).
118. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997). The Supreme Court also
recently granted certiorari to consider the question of employer liability under Title VII for hostile
environment sexual harassment. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 438 (1997). In
Faragher, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that an employer was liable for an employee's
hostile environment sexual harassment if the employer "knew or should have known" of the
harassment. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, Ill F.3d 1530, 1535 (1 1th Cir. 1997).
119. See Doe v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 1223, 1226 (5th Cir. 1997).
120. Linda Greenhouse, High Court to Weigh Liability of Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1997,
at Al.
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in the Title VII employer liability case of Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton,121 and apply that standard to Title IX when it hears Gebser. 122
Nevertheless, until the Court rules on the issue, by adopting the
"knew or should have known" standard in Kinman, the Eighth Circuit
has effectively established precedent to respond to Title IX sexual
harassment cases as they come before the courts in its jurisdiction.123
Gregory G. Pinski
1 2 4
121. 118 S. Ct. 438 (1997) (considering the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal's application of the
"knew or should have known" standard for employer liability in a Title VII hostile environment case).
122. Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 595.
123. See Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 463, 469 (8th Cir. 1996).
124. The author wishes to extend appreciation to the following individuals for their direction
and assistance in writing and editing this article: Professor Marcia O'Kelly, Mike Andrews, Todd
Chrzanowski, Tara Clark, and Gary Wallace.
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